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No. 7983 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
lx THE ~L-\TTER OF THE GE.NER.\L DETERMINATION OF 
RIGHTS TO THE USE OF 'y ATER OF BEAR RIVER DRAIN-
AGE .ARK\ rx RrcH ConxTY, STATE oF UTAH 
RANDOLPH L.-txn & LIVESTOCK CoMPANY, A CORPORA-
TION; DESERET LIVESTOCK Co::\tPAXY, A CoRPORATION; 
BouxTIFUL LrYESTOCK CoMPANY, A CoRPORATION; 
HAROLIJ ~EL.\[A~, NICK CHOURNOS, ORVAL JOHNSON, 
A..:.~D WILLIAM JOHNSON, OBJECTORS AND APPELLANTS 
v. 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WATER CLAIMANT 
AND RESPONDENT 
TH~ 8TA1'E ENGIX~ER OF THg STATE OF UTAH, 
RESPONDENT 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
No. 7983 
lx THE :\lATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF 
RIGHTS TO THE USE OF 'YATER OF BEAR RIVER DRAIN-
AGE .. .:\.REA IX RICH CorxTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDOLPH LAxD & Ln'"EBTOCK CoMPANY, A CoRPORA-
TION; DEsERET LIVESTOCK CoMPANY, A CoRPORATION; 
BouNTIFUL LIVESTOCK CoMPANY, A CoRPORATION; 
HAROLD SEL~IAN, NICK CHOURNOS, ORVAL JOHNSON, 
AXD 1Y ILLIAM J OHXSOX, OB.JECTORS AND APPELLANTS 
v. 
THE U XITED STATES OF AMERICA, \YATER CLAIMANT 
AND RESPONDENT 
THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
RESPONDENT 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Comes now the United States of America, acting 
by and through J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Attorney 
General, and A. Pratt Kesler, United States At-
torney for the District of Utah, under and pursuant 
to the authority of the Attorney General of the 
United States, and appears specially for the pur-
pose of objecting to the jurisdiction of this Honorable 
Court as to the United States of· America, and 
for no other purpose, and moves this Court to 
dismiss this cause as against the United States of 
America for want of jurisdiction over it upon the fol-
lowing grounds and for the following reasons: 
(1) 
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1. The United States of America has neither con-
sented to be sued nor waived its immunity frmn suit 
under the facts and circumstances which prevail in the 
above-entitled cause. 
2. The United States of America was not a party to 
the case in the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, In and For the County 
of Rich, In the Matter of the General Determination 
of the Rights to the Use of Water of the Bear River 
and its Tributaries, Both Surface and Underground, 
and to the Use of All Waters of the Drainage of Said 
Streams in Rich County, State of Utah, Civil No. 299, 
nor to the judgment of that Court and may not now 
be made a defendant in the cause to which this motion 
relates. 
3. There was no authority in the then United States 
Attorney nor in the Attorney for the Bureau of Rec-
lamation, who purported to represent the United 
States of A1nerica in the subject cause in the District 
Court, to appear for, or to stipulate on behalf of the 
United States of America in regard to its rights to the 
use of water. 
4. There is no justiciable controversy before this 
Court. 
Wherefore the United States of America prays that 
this cause be dismissed against the United States of 
.America for the reasons expressed above and pred-
icated upon the authorities in support of this motion 
set forth in the accompanying brief. 
NOVEMBER , 1953. 
J. LEE RANKIN, 
Assistant Attorney Gf'ueral . 
.A. PRATT KESLER, 
United States Attoruey. 
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OPINION BELOW 
There was entt•red on February 7, 1953, by Hon-
orable Lewis Jones, Judge of the First Judicial 
District Court, Rich Colmty, State of Utah, an inter-
locutory decree dismissing appellants' objections. 
From that decrep this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Attorney General of the State of Utah filed on 
May 14, 1945, in the District Court of the First 
Judicial District in and for Rich Connty, State of 
Utah, an amended petition* in this action in which 
he prayed for "a deeree * * * adjudicating the 
relative rights of all \Vater users on the Bear River 
and tributaries, both surface and nnderground, and 
the drainage within the watersheds of said streams, 
in Rich County, State of Utah, in accordance with the 
provisions of Chapter 4, Title 100, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, as amended.'' 
The Attorney General of the United States was 
not served with process in the action. No effort was 
made to join the United States of America as a party 
to the cause. Several years subsequent to the initia· 
tion of the action, representatives of the Bureau of 
Land Management of the Department of the Interior 
and of the Forest Service of the Department of Agri· 
culture made filings with the State Engineer of the 
State of Utah purporting to appropriate water on 
lands, title of which resides in the United States of 
America. There were in the aggregate thirty-five 
(35) filings made with the State Engineer.1 Thirty-
*The original petition was filed by the State Engineer on July 
13, 1942; the amendment to that petition was filed by the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah. 
1 R. 14. 
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two (32) of the filings were made by the Bureau of 
Land Management, three ( 3), by the Forest Service. 
On or about April 2, 1951, the Forest Service filed 
twelve (12) additional claims with the State Engi-
neer of the State of Utah. Those are referred to 
throughout as ''diligence claims.'' A priority date 
of 1875 was asserted for certain of those rights by the 
Forest Service. The claimed priority date was predi-
cated upon the use of the water by livestock, which 
from the date last mentioned to the present time have 
been grazed upon the public domain. 
The State Engineer approved all of the filings 
originally made by the Bureau of Land Management 
and the Forest Service.2 However, twelve (12) of 
those original filings approved by the State Engineer, 
it is reported, subsequently lapsed or were with-
drawn.3 
In accordance with the laws of the State of Utah 
and pursuant to the statutory procedure in actions 
of this character there was issued by the State Engi-
neer of that State a "Proposed Determination of Water 
Rights in Bear River, Rich County, Utah Drainage 
Area." Listed by the State Engineer in the proposed 
determination were the claims of the Bureau of Land 
Management and the Forest Service. In that docu-
ment it was recommended by the State Engineer that 
there be an allowance of all of those claims. Objec-
tions were filed by the appellants to the proposed de-
termination. Those objections are set forth in the 
brief filed by the appellants in this appeal. Praying 
for judgment, the appellants petitioned the court as 
follows: 
2R. 14. 
9 R. 14. 
i 
l 
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1. That an order now be issued awarding no 
part of the "rater rights as listed herein to the 
United States of Ainerica, and which order shall 
adjudge and decree that the United States of 
An1erica has never made and is unable to make 
a beneficial use of waters for livestock water-
ing purposes as is contemplated and required 
by the laws of the State of Utah; that such 
beneficial use is necessary to complete an appro-
priation of waters in this State, and rejecting 
each application and diligence claim filed by 
the United States of America as listed .herein. 
2. Ordering and directing the State Engineer 
to immediately reject each of the applications 
filed by the United States of America as herem 
listed, together with any other application for 
similar appropriations which might have been 
filed for or in behalf of the United States; and 
ordering and directing the State Engineer to 
issue such notices as may be required to show 
the denial of each of the diligence claims filed 
for the use of waters in the drainage area here-
in concerned. 
Predicated upon the proceedings of August 20, 
.- 1952, before Honorable Judge Lewis Jones/ a stipula-
tion was filed on September 10, 1952, Exhibit I of 
this brief. That stipulation was signed by the then 
D nited States Attorney 5 and purports to bind the 
:• United States of America. At the hearing of Sep..:_ 
-" tember 13, 1952,6 the objection was made by appellants 
to the priority date of 1875 asserted in connection 
with the diligence claims as above mentioned. An 
attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation, purporting 
'R. 28. 
GR.12. 
6 R. 44. 
278077-53-2 
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to act for the United States of America, agreed that 
the priority date of 1875 should be changed to 1899, 
one year subsequent to the most recent priority date 
of the appellants.7 The Attorney General of the 
United States of America has not authorized any 
Assistant Attorney General, any United States Attor-
ney or the attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation 
to act on behalf of the United States of America 
under the circumstances which prevail in this case. 
Predicated upon the trial of the issues,8 upon the 
stipulation,9 upon the agreement by the Attorney for 
the Bureau of Reclamation/0 the court issued a memo-
randum opinion/1 dated the 12th day of January, 
1953. Among other things, the court there declared 
that: 
* * * in each case of appropriation of water 
by the United States from the same stream or 
other source of supply, the priority of objec-
tors' rights may be shown in the final decree as 
senior to the priority of the Government's 
rights.12 
Judge Jones likewise declared in his memorandum: 
* * * in view of the waiver of priority on the 
part of the government, I do not feel that a 
justiciable controversy is presented for de-
termina tion.13 
There were entered by Honorable Judge Jones on 
February 7, 1953, the findings of fact and conclusions 
7 R. 64. 
8 R. 28-89. 
9 R. 12-15. 
10 R. 64. 
11 R. 16-17. 
12 R. 16. 
18 R. 17. 
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of la,Y.14 Set forth in those findings of fact and con-
clusions of law is the following statement: ''4. It was 
stipulated at the tria.l that in each case of appropria-
tion of water by the United States from a source of 
supply from which the objectors [appellants] have 
made an appropriation, the priority of the objectors' 
rights is senior to the priority of the right of the 
United States; * * *.'· Premised upon the stipula-
tion at the trial and upon the other findings of fa.ct, 
Judge Lewis Jones declared: 
* * * there is no justiciable issue or contest 
between the objeGtors, or any of them, and the 
United States of America. 
In the light of those findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, Judge Jones entered an interlocutory 
decree in which it was ordered, adjudged and decreed 
- that: "1. * * * there is no justicia.ble controversy 
between the objectors * * * or any of them, on the 
one hand, and the United States of America, on the other 
hand, over the claims of the United States of America 
listed in the Proposed Determination herein. * * * 
2. * * * the objections to the claims of the United 
States to the water of Bear River * * * be and they 
are hereby overruled and denied and the Petition 
setting forth the objections of said objectors is hereby 
dismissed.'' 15 
Wholly aside from the declaration of the lower 
court that there was no controversy between the 
- United States of America and the appellants, this 
appeal was taken predicated principa.lly upon the 
grounds that the United States of America did not 
and could not acquire rights to the use of water under 
the circumstances of the case. 
14 R.l8-19. 
15 R. 20. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The United States Attorney had no authority to 
enter into the stipulation purporting to bind the 
appellants and the United States of America in con-
nection with the rights claimed by the latter in the 
action in the district court. 
2. Rights to the use of water and the priorities 
asserted in connection with them are substantive 
rights in the nature of real property and neither the 
United States Attorney nor any Attorney of the Bu-
reau of Reclamation were empowered to relinquish 
those rights. 
3. This is a.n action against the United States of 
America, which has not, under the circumstances, 
waived its immunity from suit. J 
4. Sovereign immunity from suit may be waived 
only by specific Congressional enactment; no officer of 
the United States, in the absence of express authority, 
may waive that exemption or subject the propert~' of 
the United States of America to jurisdiction: that 
immunity from suit exists whatever the character of 
the proceedings, including the action to adjudicate 
rights to the use of water. 
5 . .Assuming that the lower court had jurisdiction 
of the claims of the United States, which is denied, 
there is no basis for this appeal, as there is no con-
troversy a,Ihong the parties. 
,:) ' 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
There was no authority in any official of the Department of 
Justice or any other department to stipulate in regard to the 
rights to the use of water of the United States as revealed 
by the record and Exhibit I of this brief 
By the stipulation 16 of September 10, 1952, the then 
United States .Attorney sought to bind the United 
States of .America in a manner 'vhich, if valid, would 
have resulted in the relinquishment by the United 
States of .America of valuable rights to the use of 
water. Similarly, the Attorney for the Bureau of 
.. Reclama.tion purported to relinquish priorities in 
~ connection with certain other rights originally set 
.. forth in the stipulation of September 10, 1952.17 As 
_ declared above, a careful review of the records of the 
""' Attorney General of the United States fails to dis-
close that either the then United States Attorney or 
-· the Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation was em-
powered to bind the United Sta.tes in the manner pro-
posed or that the acts of either were ratified. Thu,~ 
the stipulations of those attorneys are not and could 
., not be binding upon the Attorney General. Unfor-
tunately for all concerned, the interests of the United 
-- States in this matter are of such magnitude that the 
Attorney General on behalf of the Nationa;l Govern-
ment may not now ratify those stipulations and 
accordingly they are rejected. 
The powers of the United States Attorney to stipu-
late in connection with litigation of the character 
16 Exhibit I. 
17 R. 64. 
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here involved are clear and unequivocal. His a.uthori-
zation at that time was as follows: 
In no case shall a field attorney* enter into an 
agreed statement of facts or a stipulation to 
abide the result in another case or any stipula-
tion concluding the substantive rights of the 
United States without specific authority from 
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
the Lands Division.18 
Absent specific authorization from the Attorney 
General of the United States to the United States 
Attorney, the latter would be powerless to proceed in 
the manner attempted. Relative to the broad powers 
of the Attorney General, reference is made to the in-
vestiture of authority in that official by the Congress 
of the United States. It is provided that: "* * * 
The Attorney General shall have supervision over all 
litigation to which the United States or any agency 
thereof is a party and shall direct all United States 
attorneys * * * in the discharge of their respective 
duties." That and correlative enactments 19 vest in 
the Attorney General plenary power over litigation 
in which the United States is engaged. In numerous 
*Field Attorney includes United States Attorney. 
18 Department of Justice, Lands Division, Field Instructions, 
page 19, Subdivision E. The present authorization is: "In no case 
shall the United States Attorney or field Attorney enter into an 
agreed statement of facts or a stipulation to abide the result in 
another case or any stipulation concluding the substantive ri~hts 
of the United States without specific authority from the Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Lands Division." United 
States Attorneys' Manual, Title 5, Lands Division, page 2, 
Stipulations. 
19 28 U.S. C. 507 (b); 5 U.S. C. 300 et seq. 
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instances the courts have considered the powers of 
the Attorney General.20 
In an authoritative decision respecting the powers 
of an official of the United States of America to em-
ploy counsel to represent the United States independ-
ent of representation by the Attorney General, this 
statement "·as 1nade: '' * * * quite aside from the 
respectable authority that c-onfirms our view, we 
should have had no doubt that no suit can be brought 
except the Attorney General, his subordinate, or a 
district attorney under his 'superintendence and 
direction,' appears for the United States." 21 
There can be little doubt of the power of the At-
torney General under the circumstances to require 
prior specific approval of all stipulations of the char-
acter of those by which the then United States At-
torney and the Attorney for the Bureau of Reclama-
tion attempted to bind the United States. Neces-
sarily, with the full responsibility residing with the 
Attorney General, his subordinates could not be per-
mitted to stipulate in connection with substantive 
rights of the United States of America-absent his 
approval or the approval of an Assistant Attorney 
General. 
Cognizant of the immense value of water in the a.rid 
""\Vest,- particularly in connection with the vast graz-
ing areas here affected, the Attorney General cannot 
permit the loss of priorities in connection with those 
rights to the use of water through unauthorized 
agreements of the character here involved. His-
torically, a.nd for soundest reasons, the Attorney Gen-
20 United States v. San Jacinto Tin Oo., 125 U.S. 273,279 (1887), 
Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F. 2d 676 (U. S. Ct. App. D. C. 1939), cert. 
denied, 307 U. S. 628. See also 81 A. L. R. 124. 
21 Sutherland v. International Insurance Oo. of Neto York, 43 
F. 2d 969, 970 (C. A. 2, 1930). 
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eral has exercised with great care the power to re-
linquish claims of the United States of America to 
property or to funds. Referenc·e in that regard is 
made to an opinion written in reply to a question 
presented by the Secretary of the Treasury as to 
whether that official ha.d the power to compromise a 
claim of the United States which was in litigation. 
Asserting that there resided in the Attorney General 
the sole power to dispose of claims in litigation, the 
opinion referred to contains this declaration: "Ex-
cept as modified by the statutes already cited [which 
have no bea.ring here] the power to determine whether 
compromises should be made of pending litigation, 
would seem to rest with this Department, as the suits 
are necessarily under my control and subject to my 
direction.'' 22 Contained in the opinion last cited is 
this pertinent declaration taken from an earlier pro-
nouncement: 2;~ ''He [the Attorney General] exercises 
superintendence and direction over United States 
attorneys and general supervision over proceedings 
instituted for the benefit of the United States, and 
to him is necessarily intrusted, in the exercise of his 
sound professional discretion and because of the 
nature of the subject, the determination of many 
questions of expediency and propriety affecting the 
continuance or dismissal of lega.l proceedings. * * * 
He may absolutely dismiss or discontinue suits in 
which the Government is interested; a fortiori he may 
terminate the same upon terms, at any stage, by way 
of compromise or settlement.'' Continuing, the At-
torney General declared, in denying the power of the 
Secretary of the Treasury to compromise a. suit: 
"Without expressly deciding whether I am authorized 
22 23 Opin. Atty. Gen. 507, 508. 
23 22 Opin. Atty. Gen. 491, 494. 
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~\: to compromise an adverse claim against the Govern-
ment under this general power to conduct its litiga-
-~: tion, I am clearly of opinion from an examination of 
~ the papers that the present suit should not be com· 
-~ promised, but that the United States attorney should 
~ be instructed to press the case to a final decision.'' 24 
~ Manifest from the authorities cited is this: 
&c. All litigation of the character here involved 
is lmder the direction and superintendence of 
the Attorney General. Power to stipulate in 
com1ection with claims in the manner attempted 
resides ·with the .A.ttorney General. Only pur-
suant to specific authority from the Attorney 
General 'vas the United States Attorney em-
powered to enter into the stipulation in question. 
He did not have that specific authorization, nor 
has the stipulation ever been approved by the At-
torney General. It necessarily follows that the 
Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation was 
without power to compromise the rights of the 
United States of America in the manner at-
tempted. 
As the then United States Attorney was without 
-- authority to stipulate in connection with the claims of 
- the United States, he was without power to bind the 
~ United States in the manner proposed. Moreover, 
. ~ "* * * the rule requires of all persons dealing with 
public officers, the duty of inquiry as to their power 
and authority to bind the government; * * *. '' 25 
~;,; The Supreme Court of the United States has consis-
i!!~ tently adhered to that principle.26 
24 23 Opin. Atty. Gen. 508, 509. 
~ Hume v. United States, 132 U. S. 406, 414 (1889). 
26 Logan County v. United States, 169 U. S. 255 {1897). 
278077-53-3 
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It is the principle adhered to by this Court. On the 
subject this Court made the statement: ''The Federal 
courts have held without exception * * * that it [the 
United States] is not botmd or estopped by the acts 
of such officers or agents not within the scope of their 
authority." 27 
The highest Court has long recognized that un-
authorized acts involving litigation in which interests 
of the United States are involved are not binding 
upon it.28 This general statement and the authorities 
upon which it is premised is especially pertinent under 
the circumstances : ''An officer can * * * bind his 
government only by acts which come within the just 
exercise of his official powers and within the scope 
of his authority, * * *. An unauthorized act or dec-
laration of an officer does not estop the government 
from insisting on its invalidity. 
"Unless duly authorized by law, a board or officer 
may not waive the state's immunity from suit; nor 
may an officer of the United States, without statutory 
authority, waive conditions or limitations imposed hy 
statute in respect of suits against the United 
States. * * *." 29 
Further comment respecting the lack of authority 
in the United States Attorney or the Attorney for the 
Bureau of Reclamation to enter into the stipulations in 
question is unnecessary. That the stipulations involved 
substantive rights is a matter to be considered in the 
phase of the brief immediately succeeding. 
21 Petty et al. v. Borg, 106 Utah 531, 150 P. 2d 776, 779 (1944); 
see also cited cases. 
28 Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255 (1895); Utah Pol!'er & 
Light Oo. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916). 
29 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Sec. 254, p. 71. 
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II 
The rights to the use of water claimed by the United States 
of America are interests in real prop.erty-they are substan-
tive rights 
It is, of course, an elementary proposition, long 
recognized by this Court, that a water right is 
usufructuary and does not partake of the ownership 
_ of the corpus of the 'vater itself.30 "This usufruc-
tuary right, or ·water-right,' * * * is real property. 
It is as fundan1ental under the law of riparian rights 
as under the law of appropriation.'' 31 From the same 
source as the last quoted statement this precept is 
taken: .. The right to the flow and use of ·water, being 
a right in a natural resource, is real estate. * * * 
The right to have water flow from a river into a ditch 
is real property. A wrongful diversion of water is 
an injury to real property. The right to take water 
from a river and conduct it to a tract of land is 
realty. * * * An action to quiet title as for real 
property is proper. And an action to settle rights is 
one to quiet title to realty." Moreover, a right to the 
use of water has "all the dignity of and is an estate 
of fee simple, or a freehold." 32 Premised on a re-
- view of pertinent decisions this conclusion has been 
expressed : ''As has been held in numerous cases, a 
water right is real property." 83 
3
° Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Oo., 12 Colo. 12, 17, 19 
Pac. 836 (1888); Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702 
(1942); Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 Pac. 1112 (1910). 
See also Lindsey v. M cO lure, 136 F. 2d 65, 70 (C. A. 10, 1943) . 
81 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, 3d ed., vol. 1, sec. 
18, pp. 20, 21. 
82 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, 3d ed., vol. 1, sec. 
283, pp. 298-300 ; Sec. 285, p. 301. 
88 19 Rocky Mountain Law Review 63. 
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From the statements and authorities cited, it is 
evident that a right to the use of water is an estate in 
real property. However, the value which may be 
placed on such a right is dependent very largely upon 
the priority to which it is entitled insofar as that 
right relates to others from the same source. The 
preceding statement is simply a recognition of the 
fundamental concept of water law that, ''First in time 
is first in right." That maxim is the essence of the 
doctrine of prior appropriation. With reference to 
the subject, this statement has been made: "this court 
has repeatedly held that priorities of rights to the 
use of water are property rights. Such is the settled 
doctrine in this state. * * * Property rights in water 
consist not alone in the amount of the appropriation, 
but also in the priority of the appropriation. It often 
happens that the chief value of an appropriation con-
sists in its p1~iority over other appropriations from the 
same natural stream. Hence, to deprive a person of 
his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable prop-
erty right * * *. '' 84 
From the cited authorities it is evident that rights 
to the use of water are in the nature of interests in 
real property and that those rights together with the 
priorities asserted for them are substantive rights con-
cerning which the United States Attorney was power-
less to stipulate in the absence of specific authority 
from the .A. ttorney General. 
III 
The action in the District Court was against the United States 
of America, involving its rights to the use of water 
The action in the court below involved rights to 
the use of water -claimed by the United States of 
84 Nichols v. Mcintosh, 19 Colo. 22, 26, 27, 34 Pac. 278 (1893). 
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~ Ameriea and the priorities which it asserted in con-
~ nection with those rights. From the authorities cited ~! above, it is evident that those rights are in the nature 
~' 
of interests in real property. Suits of the character 
from \Yhich this appeal has been taken have been de-
scribed by this Court to be actions for the purpose of 
determining rights to the use of \Yater and to quiet 
title among n1.unerous e lnimants on a stream. The 
~ issues, this Court has pointed out, involve the rights 
of the parties for and against each other to all of 
the waters of the stream system.35 The Supreme 
Court of the United States has established the cri-
terion pursuant to ·which a determination may be 
- made as to whether a cause is against the sovereign. 
It declared if ''the judgment sought would expend 
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere 
;., with the public administration * * * -the suit is one 
... , against the sovereign.'' 36 That precept has been recog:-
~- nized on numerous occasions by the Supreme Court 
of the United States.37 Moreover: "A proceeding 
~~ against property in which the United States has an 
~ interest is a suit against the United States." as Free 
'C from doubt, therefore, is the fact that the action is 
~ against the United States of America with all of the 
~ 1 incidents arising from that fact. 
35 Huntsm?le Irrigation Association v. District Oourt of Weber 
Oounty, 72 Utah 431, 270 Pac. 1090 (1928). 
36 Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738 (1946). 
37 Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1895); Larson v. Domestic 
:t and Foreign Corporation, 337 U.S. 682 (1948). 
1 38 Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1938). 
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IV 
The United States of America is immune from suit in the ab. 
sence of specific waiver-anyone asserting there has been a 
waiver of that immunity must bring his case within the act 
upon which he relies 
In the factual review set forth above the statement 
is made that the Attorney General of the United 
States of America has not been served in this action. 
In that regard this fact is respectfully emphasized: 
There was no authority and there is no authority in 
any official of the United States of America to au-
thorize an appearance in proceedings of the character 
here involved under the circumstances which prevail, 
in the absence of service upon the Attorney General 
of the United States. In a subsequent phase of this 
brief that statement will be reiterated and reempha-
sized. Irrespective of that lack of authority, how-
ever, the then United States Attorney participated 
in the trial of the issues in the court below which 
was commenced on August 20, 1952, though the 
original proceedings were initiated several years 
earlier. The matter was not concluded at the date 
last mentioned but was continued until September 
13, 1952. On August 27, 1952, a wire was sent to the 
then United States Attorney purporting to authorize 
him to appear in the cause to protect the interests of 
the United States.39 There was no effort to confer 
39 WAsHINGTON, D. C., August 27, .195t2. 
ScoTT M. MATHESON, Esquire, 
United States Attorney, 
Salt Lake Oity, Utah. 
Re General Determination Rights to use of water Bear River 
Drainage Area, Rich County, and Randolph Land and Livestock 
Company, et al., pending in District Court of Rich County, Utah. 
You are authorized to appear in this matter to protect the inter· 
ests of the United States in the use of waters claimed by it. It is 
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authority upon the .. Attorney for the Bureau of Recla-
mation who, the record reveals, conducted the pro-
ceedings on behalf of the United States. Neither was 
authority conferred upon the United States Attorney 
to stipulate in the manner revealed in Exhibit I of 
this brief. 
It is necessarily concluded, therefore, that the 
participation of the then United States Attorney in 
the proceedings did not and could not constitute a 
submission of the United States to jurisdiction in the 
court below. Similarly the stipulation is without 
force and effect for reasons which have been 
expressed. 
Quite aside from the lack of authority in the then 
United States Attorney to make an appearance in 
the action, are fundamental tenets of the law which 
preclude the Attorney General himself under the cir-
cumstances from subjecting the United States of 
America to jurisdiction. Necessarily, therefore, an 
Assistant .Attorney General or the United States 
Attorney could not subject the United States of 
America to jurisdiction under the circumstances. 
The sovereign immunity from suit is a principle 
of law applied equally to the State and Federal gov-
ernments. Respecting the immunity of the State of 
Utah from suit, this Court declared: " * * * action[s] 
understood that you are familiar with these proceedings and 
that you understand that the Bureau of Land Management and 
Forest Service both have rights which need protection. All nec-
essary information re Bureau of Land Management claims can be 
procured from Regional Administrator and Regional Counsel that 
Bureau in Salt Lake City. Contact Forest Service re its claims. 
~~ Department is advised hearing will be held Friday, August 29. 
Jj16 Please give Department complete report. 
ur.r: RALPH J. LU'rl'RELL, 
Acting Assistant Attornf!11 General. 
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may not be maintained unless the state has, through 
legislative or constitutional action, given consent to 
be sued. * * * when there is statutory consent to sue 
[the State], the statute is the measure of the power to 
sue.'' 40 Again, in regard to the immunity of the State 
of Utah from suit, this declaration was made: "We 
start with the assumption that the sovereign is im-
mune from suit. To find authority for any action 
of whatever nature against the state, recourse must 
be had to the statutes. * * * There must be substan-
tial compliance with the designated statutory pro-
cedure for bringing such actions.'' 41 Adhering to the 
principles expressed by Utah's highest court, the 
Supreme Court of the United States commented as 
follows on the subject: "As we conclude that these 
suits are suits against Utah and that Utah has not 
consented to be sued for these alleged wrongful tax 
exactions in the federal courts, we express no opinion 
upon the merits of the controversy. * * * We con-
clude that the Utah statutes fall short of the clear 
declaration by a State of its consent to be sued in 
the federal courts which we think is required before 
federal courts should undertake adjudication of the 
claims of taxpayers against a state.'' 42 
In substance the Supreme Court of the United 
States and the Supreme Court of Utah have recog-
nized, insofar as the sovereign State is concerned, 
that: "It is an established principle of jurisprudence 
in all civilized nations, resting upon grounds of pub-
lic policy, that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own 
4° Campbell Bldg. Oo. v. State Road Oomm., 95 Utah 2-!2, 249, 
252, 70 P. 2d 857 ( 1937). 
41 State v. Distriot Oourt of Salt Lalce County, 102 Utah 284,285, 
115 P. 2d 913 (1941). 
42 l1ennecott Oopper Corp. ''· State Tax romm., :3~7 P. :--1. !li:~. 
576, 579, 580 ( 1945). 
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courts or in any other court without its con~ent and 
permission.'' 43 
Identical principles "~ith those enunciated above l'(~­
speeting the sovereign inuunnity of the State of Utah 
from suit are applicable to tlw United States. That 
conclusion has been recognized by the Supreine Court 
of the United States in these tel'lns: "The exemption 
from direet suit is * * * without exception. * * * 
(The United States] cannot be subjected to legal pro-
ceedings, at la-w or in equity, without thei1· consent; 
and whoever institutes such proceedings must bring 
his case ·within the authority of some act .of 
Congress.'' 44 
\\ith reference to the immunity of the United 
States of .America from suit respecting rights to the 
use of water, this statement has been made: "The 
suit is essentially one to determine the validity of the 
claimed \Y2ter right, which if valid, might present a 
question of priority and extent, * * *. * * * There 
being no consent by Congress to the suit, the bill must 
be dismissed * * *.'' 45 Consistent with the principle 
that the immunity of the United States from suit is 
without exception, is the statement of the Supreme 
Court of the United States respecting the effort on 
the part of the State of Arizona to institute an action 
involving its claimed rights to water on the Colorado 
River. In dismissing Arizona's petition the Court 
said this: '' * * * we are of the opinion that in the cir-
cumstances disclosed by the bill of complaint there 
can be no adjudication of rights in the unappropriated 
water of the Colorado river without the presence, as 
43 49 Am. Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies, Sec. 91. 
44 Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10,16 (1895). 
45 United States v. Mclnti1'e, 101 F. 2d 650, 653 (C. A. 9, 1939). 
278(177-53--4 
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a party, of the United States, which, without it'3 con-
sent, is not subject to suit even by a state." 46 
In the light of the principles enunciated above, there 
arises the question of whether the filing of claims by 
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment subjected the United States to the jurisdiction 
of the court below. Similarly the question is pre-
sented as to whether the acts of the United States 
Attorney eould subject the National Government to 
the jurisdiction of the court under the circumstances 
revealed by the record. 
v 
Neither the United States attorney nor any other official would 
be empowered to subject the United States to suit absent a 
waiver of immunity from suit by Congress 
As disclosed above, the immunity of the United 
States of America from suit is without exception. 
It is manifest that Congress and Congress alone has 
the power to waive that immunity. Clearly there 
is no authority in the United States Attorney or any 
other official of the United States of America to 
waive that immunity. That principle of sovereign 
immunity has been recognized in a vast variety of 
cases and eirClunstances. On the proposition it has 
been emphatically declared by the Supreme Court of 
the United States that: "Where jurisdiction has not 
been conferred by Congress, no officer of the United 
States has power to give any court jurisdiction of a 
suit against the United States." 47 
.. Arizona v. Oalifornia, 298 U. S. 558, 568 ( 1935). 
41 Minrwsota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382,388, 389 (1938). 
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Particularly relevant to this phase of the considera-
tion is one of the principal decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States on the subject.48 Seldom 
will a case be found whi{;h is more precisely in point 
on a proposition under consideration. In that case, 
as here, an effort \vas made to authorize the United 
States Attorney to appear in an action instituted in a 
State court against properties of the United States. 
That suit, as here, Y\·as in substance an action to quiet 
title to real property against claims asserted by the 
United States. In declaring that the official in ques-
tion was \Yithout authority to subject the rights of 
the United States to jurisdiction of the State court the 
Supreme Court of the United States declared in these 
spe{;ific terms: "It is a fundamental principle of 
public la\v, affirmed by a long series of decisions of 
this court, and clearly recognized in its former opin-
ion in this case, that no suit can be maintained against 
the United States, or against their property, in any 
court, without express authority of Congress. 147 
U. S. 512. See also Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10. 
The United States, by various acts of Congress, have 
consented to be sued in their own courts in certain 
classes of cases; but they have never consented to be 
sued in the courts of a State in any case. Neither the 
Secretary of War nor the Attorney General, nor any 
subordinate of either, has been authorized to waive the 
exemption of the United States from judicial process, 
or to submit the United States or their property, to 
the jurisdiction of the court in a suit brought against 
their officers. Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall. 199, 202; Carr 
v. United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438; United States v. 
L·ee, 106 U. S. 196, 205." 49 Turning then to the action 
·
48 Stanley v. Sohwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1895). 
"'
9 Stanley v. Sohwalby, 162 U. R 255,269-270 (1895). 
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taken by the United States Attorney who filed re-
sponsive pleadings in the cause before the State court, 
this succinct and pertinent statement was made: 
a The answer actually filed by the District Attorney, 
if treated as undertaking to make the United States 
a party defendant in the cause, and liable to have 
judgment rendered against them, was in excess of the 
instruction,s of the Attorney General, and of any 
power vested by law in hi1n or in the District Attor-
ney, and could not constitute a voluntary submission 
by the United States to the jurisdiction of the 
court." 50 [Emphasis added.] 
-Important in connection with this matter are the 
distinguishing elements between the appropriation of 
rights to the use of water and the adjudication of 
them. On the subject this statement has been made: 
"The acquiring of water rights for the purpose of 
irrigating land, and the determination by courts of 
what those rights are, after acquirement, are entirely 
different subjects, * * *." 51 Where there is involved 
the question of the adjudication of rights, the im-
munity of the United States from suit in the absence 
of waiver, is a bar to bringing an action. In the case 
last cited this comment was made: "The suit being 
one against the United States, the court is without 
jurisdiction, in the absence of an act of Congress waiv-
ing immunity from suit." 52 An examination of the 
statutes fails to reveal any basis upon which the filings 
by the Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Manage-
-ment could subject the United States to jurisdiction in 
a State court. 
60 Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255,270 (1895). 
51 North Side Oanal Oo. v. Twin Falls Oanal Oo., 12 F. 2d 311, 
314 (D. C. S.D. Idaho, 1926). 
112 North Side Oanal Oo. v. Twin Falls Oanal Oo., 12 F. 2d 311, 
313 (D. C. S.D. Idaho, 1926); U.S. v. M('/nti.re, 101 F. 2d 650. 
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VI 
Section 208 of the Department of Justice Appropriation Act 
of 1952 has no application to this case (43 U.S. C. 666) 
The ... ~ttorney General of the United States of 
America has not been served in this case. Yet the act 
cited in the caption of this phase of the brief contains 
this requiren1ent: ''Summons or other process in any 
such suit [adjudication of rights to the use of water] 
shall be serYed upon the .._L\..ttorney General or his 
<lesignated representative." Important here is the 
fact that th~ Attorney General of the United States 
of America has not and in view of the authorities 
cited above, it is respectfully submitted, could not 
waive the req~.1irements regarding process. Also, as 
emphasized above, the Attorney General of the United 
States of America has not authorized any officer of the 
Department of Justice or of any other Department to 
waive the requirement that process be served upon 
him. Thus the purpo-rted authorization to the then 
United States Attorney was a nullity and could not 
effectuate a submission of the National Government 
to the jurisdiction of the court below or of this Court. 
Having failed to serve the Attorney General or in 
any way to bring that official before the court, it is 
evident that the principles respecting the immunity 
from suit which have been reviewed at length above 
constitute a bar to the joinder of the United States 
in the case. As discussed above, " * * * whoever in-
stitutes such proceedings [against the United States] 
must bring his case within the authority of some act 
of Congress." 53 Further, as stated above, any waiver 
of immunity of the United States from suit must be 
53 Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10,16 (1895). 
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strictly construed.54 Respecting actions against States 
this authoritative statement has been made: " * * * 
most courts hold that statutes waiving the state's 
immunity from suit and permitting suit to be brought 
against it, being in derogation of sovereignty, must be 
strictly construed.'' 55 In conformity with that doc-
trine as revealed above, the consent of the State of 
Utah to be sued for an occupation tax refund "in 
any court of competent jurisdiction'' was not con-
strued by the highest tribunal as a consent to be sued 
in federal court.56 Conforming to the principle 
enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
it has been held that a statute is jurisdictional which 
requires a notice to be filed with the Attorney General 
of the State prior to bringing a claim against the 
State of New York.57 
A correlative principle militating strongly against 
the joinder of the United States in the action are 
basic tenets of statutory construction. Fundamental 
in that connection is the precept that: "Retrospective 
operation [of a statute] is not favored by the courts, 
* * * and a law will not be construed as retroactive 
unless the act clearly, by express language or neces-
sary implication, indicates that the legislature in-
tended a retroactive application." 58 It has likewise 
been declared that: "Because of the intuitive belief 
that there is something inherently bad in retroactive 
legislation, some states have adopted express constitu-
tional provisions against retroactive laws." 59 While 
54 United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 502 (1939). 
55 49 Am. Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies, Sec. 97, 
p. 314. 
56 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State TaaJ Commission, 327 U.S. 
573 (1945). 
57 Buckles v. State, 221 N.Y. 418, lli N. E. 811 (1917). 
58 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., vol. 2, page ll!'i. 
59 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., vol. 2, page 119. 
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the State of Utah i~ not among those States lnen-
tioned, there is no reason to assnnle that this IIonor-
able Court would find retroactive laws less repugnant 
than other courts have found them. Yet only by 
treating Section 208 of the Department of Justice 
Appropriation Act of 1952 as being retrospective is it 
possible to apply it to this case. That act was enacted 
ten years subsequent to the initiation of the subject 
case. Certaip. of the claims-the so-called ''diligence 
claims~ ·-were filed ten years subsequent to the initia-
tion of the suit. 
Predicated upon the above principles, it is respect-
fully submitted that the United States was not before 
the district court below and any action taken there is 
without effect insofar as the interests of the United 
States are concerned. 
VII 
Assuming the District Court had jurisdiction, which is denied, 
this Court will not consider moot questions 
A consideration of the record in the case reveals 
that there is no actual controversy-no justiciable 
issue before the Court. There is nothing in the rec-
ord which reveals that either the Bureau of Land 
Management or the Forest Service are utilizing water 
which the appellants claim they are entitled to re-
ceive. Thus it is manifest that there is no conflict 
in fact between the United States of America and the 
appellants. Moreover, assuming that the stipulations 
had validity, or that the district court had jurisdiction 
over the properties of the United States, it is clear 
that the United States Attorney had stipulated in a 
manner which removed any possible conflict among 
the parties. It is evident as a consequence of those 
facts that the appellants have presented to this court 
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a moot question. That an appellate court will not 
assume jurisdiction of moot questions is a tenet of 
the law too well established to contend against. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has long ad-
hered to that fundamental tenet. On the subject it 
has stated: 
To predetermine, even in the limited field of 
water power, the rights of different sovereign-
ties, pregnant ·with future controversies, is be-
yond the judicial function. The courts deal 
with concrete legal issues, presented in actual 
cases, not abstractions.60 
.Again the same Court declaring that the funda-
mental principles limiting adjudications to actual 
cases and controversies are not affected by the fact 
that it would be convenient to the parties and to the 
public to have a particular matter resolved stated: 
vVe deal, however, not with the theoretical dis-
putes but with concrete and specific issues 
raised by actual cases. * * * "Constitutional 
questions are not to be dealt with abstractly." 
* * * They will not be anticipated but will be 
dealt with only as they are appropriately raised 
upon a record before us. * * * Nor will we 
assume in advance that a State will so con-
strue its law as to bring it into conflict with the 
federal Constitution or an act of Congress.81 
This Court adhering to the same principles enun-
ciated a.bove declared in regard to an action to quiet 
title : "We see no merit" in this appeal in connec-
tion with a request by an appellant to have reviewed a 
60 United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Oo., 311 U. S. 
377, 423 (1940), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712. 
56 Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U. S. 7 +O, 746 ( 1941); 
see also Arizona v. Oalifonda, ~8:~ P. ~. 42:~~ 46a, +Ci-l (1 nao). 
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quiet title decree which revealed that there was no 
substantial controversy among the parties.62 The 
opinion of this Court in a 1nore recent decision con-
tained this sta.tement : 
Even courts of general jurisdiction have no 
power to decide abstract questions or to render 
declaratory judgn1ents, in the absence of an 
actual controversy directly involving rights.88 
That doctrine has been adhered to by this Court in 
litigation inT"olving rights to the use of water.64 There 
it is declared: 
Before the plaintiff in this suit ca.n be heard to 
complain because he has been deprived of the 
use of the water flowing from the springs in 
question, he must establish some right to the 
use of such water or a part thereof. * * * 
The plaintiff, being without any right in the 
water here in controversy, cannot be heard to 
complain because the owner so uses the water 
that pla.intiff derives no benefit from such use. 
The trial court properly entered judgment dis-
missing plaintiff's complaint. 
As the record in this case reveals no conflict be..; 
tween the appellants and the United States of 
America, the doctrine of the last cited case, it is re-
spectfully submitted, is controlling. 
More recently, this Court reiterated the same prin-
eiple.65 That principle has been adhered to by courts 
in other Western States.66 
62 Fitzpatrick v. Brown, 41 Utah 139,142,124 Pac. 769 (1912). 
63 University of Utah v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 64 
Utah 273,229 Pac. 1103, 1104 (1924). 
64 Gianulakis v. Sharp, 71 Utah 528, 267 Pac. 1017, 1019 (1928). 
65 Gillet al. v. Tracy et al., 80 Utah 127, 13 P. 2d 329, 333 (1932). 
66 Binning v. Miller, 55 'Vyo. 451, 102 P. 2d 54, 62 (1940); 
Denver & Rio Grande ll7 estern R. Oo. v. Himonas, 190 F. 2d ipi2 
(C. A. 9, 1951). 
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As emphasized by the Supreme Court of the State 
of Wyoming: 
The discussion is wholly academic. Before a 
party may attack the right of another, either 
on constitutional or other grounds, he must 
first show that he himself has a right which 
has been inva.ded thereby. He must have an 
interest which is affected.67 
The principles reviewed uphold the judgment be-
low of Judge Lewis J ones.68 Those cited opinions 
bear out this C'onclusion on the general proposition: 
''The province of a court is to decide real contro-
versies, not to discuss or give opinions on abstract 
propositions or moot questions. The duties and 
powers of courts are, therefore, limited to the deter-
mination of rights actually controverted in particular 
cases before them. * * * courts have neither the 
right nor the inclination to express a.n opinion upon 
moot questions or questions not arising on the facts 
before them, since such questions require no answer. 
* * * An appellate court will not give an opinion 
upon the request of the parties and for their guidance 
in a case not properly before it and in which it has 
no jurisdiction. '' 69 
.As appellants are unable to disclose any invasion 
of their rights the matter presents no issue to this 
Court. They allege no present injury and vaguely 
refer to the possibility that the United States of 
America proposes to dominate and to control pri-
vately-owned property through applications for ap-
propriations. 'rhere is not a scintilla of evidence that 
there is such an intention on the part of the United 
67 Campbell et al. v. Wyoming Development Oo. et al., 55 Wyo. 
347, 100 P. 2d 124, 140 (1940). 
68 Hu1d.<n·i1Tc In·. ~hs11. v. /Ji.·dri<·t roul/'f, 7:2 Utah -l:H, 2i0 P:lr. 
1090 ( 1928). 
69 l4Am. Jur., Courts, Sec. 49. 
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States. .Appellants' efforts to secure a ruling on these 
abstract qut'stions fall squarely within the JH'{'ecpt of 
the law that the rourts deal only with legal issues 
presented in actunl rases in which there exists a 
genuine controYersy. U ndC'r those circumstances, it 
- is respectfully submitted, this Honorable Court should 
dismiss the appeal on the grounds that there is no 
justiciable issue, thus sustaining the judgment of 
Judge Lewis Jones in the court below. 
Though the appeal should be dismissed for want of 
- a justiciable issue it is reiterated and reaffirmed on 
the principles reviewed above that the district court 
__ was without jurisdiction by reason of the fact that the 
United States had not "\-vaived its immunity from suit 
under the circumstances which prevail. It is like-
wise reiterated that the officers who sought to repre-
sent the United States of America and to bind it by 
the stipulations alluded to, acted without authority 
in the matter. 
VIII 
Neither the officials of the Bureau of Land Management nor 
the officials of the Forest Servic.e were empowered to subject 
the United States to jurisdiction under the circumstances 
Appellants cite no authority, and it is respectfully 
submitted that there is no authority, which would 
permit representatives of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement or of the Forest Service to subject the United 
States of America to the jurisdiction of the district 
court by the mere filing of applications With the State 
Engineer. It is likewise respectfully submitted that 
the properties of the United States are not controlled 
by the legislature of. the State of Utah.70 Similarly it 
is respectfully submitted that, ''State laws cannot 
affect titles vested in the United States of America." n 
10 0amfieldv. United States, 167U. S. 518 (1896). 
'' Pnited Stutes '"· Uta.h, 28;3 U. S. 64, 7:> (1930). See also En-
abling Act for the State of Utah, Act of July 16, 1894 (28 Stat. 
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That the United States of America is not subject to 
the police regulations of the State is too well estab-
lished for question.72 Thus the laws relied upon by 
the appellants have no bearing upon the rights or 
interests of the United States. 
Irrespective of those fundamental tenets of the law 
the appellants urge that the United States of America 
has no rights to the use of water for the thousands of 
head of livestock which graze upon the lands of the 
National Government administered by the Bureau 
of Land Management and the Forest Service. Their 
assertions, however, are purely academic for the 
record reveals no encroachment or threat of encroach-
ment by the United States of America upon the vested 
rights of the appellants. As emphasized above, there 
was no justiciable issue presented in the court below 
nor is there an issue here in regard to the respective 
rights of the United States of America and the 
appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
Predicated upon the authorities reviewed above, this 
Honorable Court is respectfully requested to dismiss 
this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
J. LEE RANKIN, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
A. PRATT KEsLER, 
United States Attorney. 
107) ; Constitution of Utah, Article III; Utah Powe1· & Light Co. 
v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916). 
72 Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 ( 1928) ; Arizona v. OoM-
fornia, 283 U.S. 423 (1930); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 
(1911). See also 13 A. L. R. 2d 1095. 
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ExHIBIT I 
In the District Court of Rich County, State of Utah 
:IN THE ~lATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF 
RroHTS To THE UsE oF WATER oF BEAR RIVER DRAIN-
AGE AREA IN RICH COUNTY, UTAH 
Stipulation 
The water rights asserted by the United States of 
~ America in this case are limited to rights which 
- can be acquired under the laws of the State of Utah. 
Any sovereign rights which the United States of 
. America might claim in or with respect to the waters 
of Bear River as an interstate stream, are not listed 
in the Proposed Determination of the State Engineer, 
- and are not before the court. The alleged water 
rights of the United States consist of (1) so-called 
"diligence rights" based upon an alleged beneficial use 
- initiated prior to 1903 and evidenced by water users' 
- claims filed with the State Engineer allegedly pur-
suant to the provisions of Section 3, Chapter 97, Laws 
of Utah 1949, and (2) applications for appropriation 
of water filed by the United States allegedly pursuant 
to the provisions of Chapter 3, Title 100, Utah Code 
, Annotated 1943, as amended. 
It is stipulated: 
1. On or about April 2, 1951, the United States of 
America filed with the State Engineer water users' 
claims numbered 1104 to 1115, both inclusive, which 
claims are listed as diligence claims in the Proposed 
Determination on pages 361 and 362. The diligence 
claims are based upon the use of water for stock 
(33) 
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watering purposes by livestock operators and others 
who in the past have grazed livestock on the public 
domain. Such use commenced in 1875 and has con-
tinued down to the present time. 
2. The United States of America has neither owned 
nor operated any of the livestock which has watered 
at the sources of supply or at any of the watering 
places listed in either the claims of diligence rights or 
in the applications for appropriation. Any beneficial 
use of the waters with which the United States or any 
governmental agency is here concerned is a use made 
by livestock exclusively owned and operated by inter-
ests other than the United States of America. 
3. No grazing permits were issued on the Cache 
National Forest by the United States Forest Service 
prior to 1906·, and no permits for grazing of live-
stock on public lands of the United States outside of 
the national forest were issued prior to 1935. 
4. In filing the aforesaid diligence rights claims on 
April 2, 1951, the officials of the United States at 
whose instance said claims were filed, did so in the 
belief that the past use of the water at the points 
listed in the claiiQs, by livestock operators, has inured 
to the benefit of the United States of America. In 
filing the applications to appropriate water, the gov-
ernment officials at whose instance such applications 
were filed, did so with the purpose of acquiring for 
the United States of America, water rights through 
the use of water by livestock operators grazing live-
stock under permits issued by the United States for 
the use of forage grown on public lands. 
5. The sources of water supply described in the so-
called "diligence rights" claims described above, and 
in the applications for appropriation filed by the 
United States of America as listed below, arise gen· 
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erally upon public lands of the United States, with 
the possible exception of Little Crawford Spring, 
shown in the State Engineer's Proposed Determina-
tion as Claim ~o. 2'75. "\Vaters from some of said 
sources run off the public lands, onto privately owned 
lands of objectors and other~. 1\ll stremns referred 
to in the diligence claims listed above, and in the 
applications for appropriation listed belov.r, run 
through public lands and also through privately owned 
lands in Rich County, Utah. The objectors and other 
livestock opera tors in the area concerned, own ranches 
and also range lands, through which these streams 
run. Some of these privately owned lands border 
upon and some lie across each of the streams men-
tioned in the claims filed by the United States of 
America. Objectors and other livestock operators also 
own lands in the vicinity of each of the streams and 
springs hereinabove m,entioned, so that the waters 
involved in controversy can be properly utilized by 
livestock which graze on these privately owned lands. 
6. The following applications for appropriation of 
water were filed by the United States with the State 
Engineer of the State of Utah, were approved by him 
and according to the records of his office are in good 
.standing: 
17239 
17240 
17272 
20337 
16881 
16877 
A-2388 
16879 
16788 
16787 
19622 
16791 
20077 
16806 
16884 
21297 
16809 
16883 
16805 
16880 
16785 
19954 
16885 
7. The following applications for appropriation of 
water were filed by the United States with the State 
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Engineer, were approved by him, but subsequently 
such applications lapsed or were withdrawn: 
17241* 16886 19872 16789 
16887 16807 16790 16808 
16878 16810 16786* 16882 
8. The objectors herein claim rights as listed in the 
State Engineer's Proposed Determination, on the 
same streams or water courses, but downstream from 
points of diversion specified in the claims or appli-
cations of the United States of America. Objectors 
also claim rights in opposition to the claims of the 
United States as listed in the State Engineer's Pro-
posed Determination, designated as follows: 
Objectors' United States' 
Source 
Claim Page Claim Page 
682 156 Upper Otter Creek Spring______________________________ 779 328 
508 166 Upper Otter Creek---------------.----------------------- 779 328 
275 129 Little Crawford Spring__________________________________ 780 327 
499 173 Hawk Spring___________________________________________ 784 328 
495 152 Old Canyon Spring_____________________________________ 795 328 
500 155 Otter Creek Spring______________________________________ 774 326 
(S) MILTON A. OMAN, 
(S) PAUL E. REIMANN, 
BY MALL, 
Counsel for Objectors, Randolph Land and 
Livestock Company, Deseret Livestock 
Company, Bountiful Livestock Company, 
Harold Selman, Nick Chournos, On•il 
Johnson, William Johnson. 
No.--. 
( S) Scott M. Matheson, 
ScoTT M. MATHESON, 
U. S. Attoruey. 
(S) J. LAMBERT GIBSON, 
Attorney for State !Cn,qiHcl'r. 
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In the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Utah, in and for the County of Rich. 
Filed September 10, 1952. 
( S) ADOLPH 'V. LARSON, 
Clerk. 
By------
Deputy. 
V, I, 80YIRNIIENT PRINTING OFFICII IllS 
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